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Regardless of any final ORS system architecture, space based platforms--and ultimately, warfighters--will benefit from timely and responsive transportation to operational orbits. This paper will examine current and future ORS programs will have to compete for funding with wartime spending obligations, economic stimulus programs, and service initiatives such as Army transformation and aircraft acquisition programs. Unlike Schriever's ICBM programs, which had to be created and matured, ORS will be able to leverage a highly developed and capable space industrial base that has already produced space systems capable of fulfilling the ORS program's requirements.
responsiveness requirements EELVs are incapable of satisfying and it will evaluate launch vehicle alternatives to address those specific shortfalls. Finally, this paper will examine spacelift systems in responsiveness terms as applied to general ORS concepts. The paper will not attempt to match specific ORS payloads or satellites to a particular launch vehicle or launch system. Chapter 1 will "unpack" the ORS concept, past and present. Next, Chapter 2 will examine the drivers and needs for responsive space systems, that is, "Why ORS?" Chapter 2 will also capture and evaluate the ORS responsive launch requirements.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to analyzing EELV's responsive launch capabilities and the currently untapped capacity not exercised by the current launch on schedule CONOP employed by government launch agencies. Additionally, Chapter 3 will discuss the investments necessary to unlock the responsiveness potential of the EELV system.
Finally, it will also evaluate various EELV CONOPS that are available to improve system responsiveness. Chapter 4 will assess the Launch-on-Demand (LOD) concept and will analyze the launch vehicles capable of satisfying LOD requirements. Finally, Chapter 4 will evaluate if LOD is a necessary concept given the current and anticipated national security threat environment with regard to space. All told, this paper presents an alternate strategy for the ORS program to consider for ORS launch vehicle requirements.
ORS APPROACH ORS Past
Desert Storm was a watershed event for space systems. Satellites, and the ground systems and people trained to control them, played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict. Space owned the battlefield. We had a robust on-orbit constellation and the inherent spacecraft flexibility to alter our operations to support specific needs of the terrestrial warfighter. 3. Recoverable, rapid-response transport to, through and from space. Operationally Responsive Space plan.
ORS Present
In program; the answer is a complex web of issues driven by the National Security Strategy (NSS). Additionally, in light of the nation's current economic problems and DoD budget shortfalls, even if the answer is "Yes, we need ORS," a follow-on question emerges, "Do we need it now?"
The short answer appears to be 'yes.' The issues ORS purports to solve should be addressed sooner rather than later, largely because of the transformation effects that space has provided to air, ground, and maritime forces. The value of these effects will not diminish, so recognizing that "the nation's space capabilities directly impact speed of maneuver, the tempo of the fight, and the boldness and lethality of our forces," 14 it's appropriate to conclude the warfighter requires worldwide, timely, and assured on-orbit capabilities. Therefore, "the ability to maintain, replenish, and augment space assets in a given theater is now more operationally and time critical than ever." Fortunately, the Air Force already operates spacelift systems that are capable of meeting most responsiveness requirements. By utilizing existing launch systems, the ORS program can concentrate fulfilling other aspects of responsive space that will meet the combatant commanders' requirements.
Responsiveness Defined
The next chapter will analyze the responsive systems mentioned above. In order to discuss the launch systems in detail, the term "responsiveness" must be defined.
The words "responsive," "rapid," and "quick" all are mentioned in the April 2008 ORS implementation plan in regard to spacelift requirements, however, these descriptors are imprecisely defined using the terms days, weeks and months in the ORS plan's tier structure. Additionally, the tier structure outlines requirements to deploy entire space systems and does not contain responsive launch requirements. However, with a careful examination of the tier structure and the deployment timelines contained in each tier, responsive launch requirements can be estimated. The three tiers and their associated timelines are defined as follows:
• Tier 1: On-demand use of existing systems. Tier 1 does not require responsive launch capabilities and is the existing model for launch.
• Tier 2: Deploying new or additional capabilities that are "field ready." The objective of tier 2 is to deliver capabilities in days to weeks. This requirement is the baseline for the EELV responsiveness argument.
• 
EELVs FOR ORS EELV Description
While it is unlikely that EELV will now attract the large number of commercial payloads that were initially expected, 18 it was designed and engineered to support a robust launch schedule. This means the EELV has an associated launch infrastructure that can still accommodate a significant launch demand. Currently, United States To this end, the policy mandated that appropriate government agencies work to maintain strong launch systems and infrastructure while modernizing space transportation capabilities and encouraging cost reductions. In October 1994, the U.S.
Air Force was selected as the executive agency for the newly created EELV program.
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The objective of the project was to develop a national space launch system capable of reliably satisfying the government's national mission model requirements while reducing space launch costs by at least 25 percent. Under the EELV program's original [1994] acquisition strategy, the Air Force would select a single contractor. In November 1997, however, a new acquisition approach was adopted because it was determined that a larger than previously envisioned commercial market would support two contractors. The intent was that this new arrangement would create two vehicle families capable of meeting government requirements while also capturing commercial launches, which would result in lower mission costs and higher reliability for all. Currently, the EELV Combined with the basic launch rates of 12 launches at Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) per year, which may include one heavy mission, and six launches at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) per year, with two contractors, the total launch capability would be 48 launches per year, or 4 per month. Because of cost trade-offs while acquiring the EELV system, strategy changes, and realities of the commercial market collapse, the ORD-2's required launch rates were never realized by the EELV system; Delta IV and Atlas V have a to-date combined total of 24 launches over the last 6 years. None-the-less, the EELV system was designed to satisfy a high launch rate, and the associated EELV launch infrastructure was built to meet the ORD-2 requirements. Accordingly, today's EELV launch system is underutilized and an opportunity exists for ORS to exploit EELV's unlocked responsive capabilities at what would be expected to be relatively low cost.
Program and CONOPS
The last section made clear the EELV infrastructure is in place to support ORS requirements. However, the current acquisition program and CONOPS would require changes to accommodate and support ORS responsiveness requirements. Keep in mind while reading this section that program and CONOPS changes would require investment from the United States Government. This is important to note when discussing the trade-offs between using existing systems and acquiring a new family of launch vehicles for the ORS program.
In order to meet the ORS responsive launch requirements, a launch vehicle would have to be physically available at the launch base for crisis response call-up.
Currently, the EELV program office purchases boosters based on an approved planning document called the National Launch Forecast (NLF). Based on the NLF, the contractor is notified or awarded a mission nearly two years in advance and the booster is called-up (ordered) one year prior to the required launch date. At that time, the launch vehicle is assigned to support a particular space mission. Air Force, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Space Launch (NRO/OSL) all assign mission assurance teams to track "their" booster from production, to the launch base, and through launch operations.
They also monitor the changes needed for the booster to accommodate a specific spacecraft. In the current system, a booster is not available for use by anyone else, including ORS, other than the specific customer; that is, a booster and a spacecraft become a "matched pair."
To address the assured access requirements in the ORD, AFSPC had at one time proposed a "rolling booster" CONOP. This CONOP called for an already manufactured booster to be present at the launch base for an instant call-up.
The rolling booster concept allows the USG to order a generic LV (launch vehicle) early and use it as an available inventory item in case of a rapid launch need. This generic hardware configuration will reflect the USG's expectation of mission needs to ensure that all required hardware items (booster, upperstage, fairing, strap-ons) are available when needed. The rolling booster aspect means that hardware is used for the next manifested mission, therefore, not subject to component life and obsolescence issues. In a nutshell, this approach provides the USG the use of the next available booster.
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At the time of the rolling booster proposal, AFSPC envisioned a robust launch schedule that failed to materialize, resulting in the current launch on schedule CONOP. The rolling booster concept has a weakness in that the USAF, NASA, the NRO, and a variety of contractors might have to make internal mission assurance CONOP adjustments and address schedule changes to accommodate the "rolling booster" or crisis launch with little or no benefit to their programs. However, the influx of funding provided by an additional customer into the EELV program would result in reduced "overhead" (shared) costs and would create a responsive EELV capability that could eventually benefit all launch customers.
Small Payload Adapter
Another capability that should be of interest to the ORS program is the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA; see Figure 2 ). "The ESPA is designed to take advantage of unused payload margin to deploy up to six 181 kg (400 lb The ESPA, by itself, is another option to consider verses developing a small launch vehicle for small payloads. The ESPA provides the opportunity to package or bundle small satellites with a larger payload to provide a package of capabilities to the combatant commander. Coupled with the rolling booster CONOP, this capability can
The STP-1 launch demonstrated that a set of interrelated satellites could be successfully deployed to at least two orbits. Additionally, the set of satellites shared the cost of the launch, thereby significantly lowering the total cost to each individual satellite program. This was ESPA's only launch to date. Unfortunately, many primary satellite programs consider using the ESPA with "their" launch as additional risk and discourage or refuse to offer the additional margin to others. This "launch margin ownership" issue needs to be changed with policy from the Secretary of Defense. not only meet responsive launch needs but also provide a robust, tailorable, and scalable set of on-orbit missions for a specific theater or combat operation.
Figure 2: ESPA Payload Adapter Concept
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LAUNCH ON DEMAND
The "crisis launch" need for launch-on-demand (LOD) has long been associated with the ORS concept. In fact, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics used this responsive option in the 18 years the capability has been available.
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As described above, EELVs cannot meet LOD timeframes for launch. However, the concept offered in the previous chapter, where EELVs and ESPA are used to deploy a set of capabilities to the combatant commanders, has essential elements that are shared with some LOD ideas and potential CONOPs. "The key to configuring a practical LOD system is defining a small set of "core" bus vehicles that can "mix and match" with a number of payload "kits" to satisfy the specific needs of the mission." 
CONCLUSION
Today's military depends on space capabilities for effective and efficient combat operations. Since the first Gulf War, much progress has been made integrating on-orbit space capabilities into traditional operational and tactical combat operations. The ORS program's task is to develop new space systems that will meet combatant commanders' requirements and deploy these capabilities in operationally relevant timeframes.
One option available to meet ORS responsive launch requirements is the EELV family of launch vehicles. Changes in launch operations CONOPs and use of the ESPA provide the flexibility and responsiveness needed to meet combatant commanders' requirements. While actual costs were not studied, investments necessary to ensure vehicles and infrastructure are ready for crisis launches are likely substantial. However, when compared to developing, testing, deploying, operating and maintaining an "exclusive use" launch system, this EELV option appears quite sensible.
Now is an opportune time to take advantage of EELVs responsiveness capabilities. The EELV program office is continually "right sizing" the EELV workforce and infrastructure to meet the demands of launch on schedule requirements while providing a lower cost launch capability to USG satellite programs. This program optimization includes making cost trades and consolidation initiatives that affect responsiveness capabilities. These "initiatives" are still reversible, but the window of opportunity will not last forever. The addition of ORS as a USG user would enhance the EELV system for all users.
Beyond the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) there is still no validated requirement for launch-on-demand systems. However, the ORS office needs to monitor and encourage the technological developments required for a future LOD capability.
